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1. Introduction 
Both economic theory and empirical evidence support the view that R&D plays a vital role in 
raising productivity on a sustainable basis (see, e.g., Griliches, 1992, and Romer, 1990). The 
social return on R&D investment is often higher than the private return to the investing firm. 
Thus, one can justify policy intervention if a well-designed intervention scheme can be 
implemented. Since the 1990s, OECD countries have tended to rely on fiscal policy 
incentives to promote R&D spending in the business sector. In 1996, 12 OECD countries 
offered tax incentives for R&D expenses; by 2004 this number had increased to 18, with 
Norway as one of the newcomers. 
R&D incentives are designed in many different ways. Some countries offer incremental 
schemes targeting only increases in R&D expenses, while others have volume-based 
incentives. A few countries have both. Although more countries have introduced tax 
incentives over time, no consensus exists as to what is best practice. Evaluation of the 
incentives in various countries may help determine which policies or policy mixes work well. 
R&D spending in the Norwegian business sector as a share of GDP is below the OECD 
average. To stimulate private R&D investment, the Norwegian government has traditionally 
used direct R&D subsidies. In 2002 Norway supplemented this policy with an R&D tax credit 
scheme—SkatteFUNN—for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which by 2003 
became available to all firms. SkatteFUNN provides a volume-based tax credit to firms with 
an R&D project that the Norwegian Research Council has approved.1 A tax credit of 18 
percent (20 percent for SMEs) of R&D costs for the approved project is deductible from the 
firm’s income tax, with a project cost cap roughly equal to half a million euros. If the firm 
does not pay any tax or pays less tax than the tax credit, the credit is paid to the firm as if it 
were a grant. Appendix A presents the SkatteFUNN scheme and its background in more 
detail. 
In this paper we study the effects of SkatteFUNN on firms’ innovation activities and 
patenting. We analyze three types of innovations: a new (or improved) product for the firm, a 
                                                 
1 The Norwegian Research Council does not evaluate either the “success probability” or the social return to the project. It is 
sufficient for approval to fulfill the formal criteria for being an R&D project, resulting in the acceptance of as many as 70–75 
percent of applications each year. 
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new (or improved) product for the market, and a new (or improved) production process. We 
also have information on patent applications. We focus on the following three questions. 
First, how is the introduction of innovations related to R&D? While R&D is obviously an 
important factor behind innovation, it is not the only one. The availability of high–skilled 
workers is another important factor. Moreover, the effects of R&D can vary depending on the 
firm’s size, location and industry. 
Second, does SkatteFUNN lead to more innovations? Hægeland and Møen (2007) find that 
firms receiving support through SkatteFUNN are more likely to increase their R&D 
investments than other firms. The question remains whether there is a causal relation between 
SkatteFUNN and firms’ innovations. 
Third, do the answers differ for different types of innovations? One important reason for 
government intervention in the market for R&D is to create spillovers. However, if firms 
receiving subsidies mainly innovate in the form of new products for the firm, but not for the 
market (i.e., imitate other firms), it is not clear that the scheme will reach those R&D 
activities with the largest potential for spillovers. 
For the analysis, we use Norwegian microdata covering firms included in the 2001 and 2004 
innovation surveys. These surveys contain information on the inputs and outputs of firms’ 
innovative activities, e.g., whether firms have introduced product or process innovations and 
whether they have applied for a patent over the three-year period before each survey. The 
2001 survey covers the three years before the introduction of SkatteFUNN (1999–2001), 
while the 2004 survey covers the three years following the introduction of SkatteFUNN 
(2002–2004). By supplementing these data with information from different registers, we 
obtain two repeated cross sections of the innovation variables (with many firms included in 
both surveys) and six years of observations on R&D and other variables. 
Our modeling framework is influenced by Griliches (1990), Crepon et al. (1998) and Parisi et 
al. (2006). The main idea in this literature is that by investing in R&D, the firm accumulates 
R&D capital, which plays an important role in the innovation activity. Using binary 
regression models, we model the probability of innovating and patenting as a function of the 
R&D capital stock at the beginning of each three year period, participation in SkatteFUNN, 
and different firm characteristics (size, industry, share of highly skilled workers, etc.). Even if 
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R&D investments are simultaneously determined with innovations, the timing of our R&D 
variable allows us to consider the R&D capital stock as predetermined. Moreover, access to 
panel data gives us an opportunity to estimate models that explicitly take into account the 
persistence of innovation activities within firms by conditioning on past innovation and 
patenting activities. To identify causal effects of SkatteFUNN, we model the probability of 
obtaining SkatteFUNN and the probability of innovations simultaneously. 
Our results show that the SkatteFUNN scheme contributes to an increase in the rate of 
innovation by firms. SkatteFUNN projects contribute to the development of new production 
processes and, to some extent, to new products for the firm. The firms that collaborate with 
other firms in their R&D activity are more likely to innovate. However, the scheme does not 
appear to contribute to innovations in the form of new products for the market or more 
patenting. 
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our study in the context of the 
existing literature. Section 3 presents the data and provides descriptive statistics on R&D, 
innovations and patent applications. Section 4 describes the model framework. Section 5 
presents the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Our study in the context of the existing literature 
There exists a relatively large literature evaluating the effects of public R&D subsidies on 
firms’ R&D investment. Some recent examples include Wallsten (2000), who examined the 
U.S. Small Business Innovation Research program, Lach (2000), who studied an Israeli 
scheme of R&D subsidies for manufacturing firms, and Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), who 
studied a German R&D subsidy program. These studies focus on possible crowding-out 
effects; i.e., whether the firms substitute their private R&D investments with public R&D 
funding. Very few studies examine effects on output measures, such as patent applications 
and innovations. One such study is the evaluation of the Dutch R&D subsidy program 
(WBSO); cf. de Jong and Verhoeven (2007), who examined how WBSO influences the 
proportion of turnover from sales of new products and services. They reported a significant 
positive effect of WBSO on their output measure. However, like most other studies in this 
area, they did not pay attention to selection bias problems, contrary to the recommendations 
of Klette et al. (2000) and David et al. (2002). The latter two studies pointed out the necessity 
of controlling for self-selection bias when evaluating the effects of R&D programs. 
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When evaluating a public policy program, one must address the following counterfactual 
question: what is the change in the response variable, Y, compared with the value Y would 
have had in the absence of the program? One cannot answer this question just by regressing Y 
(e.g., the number of patent applications) on a dummy for whether the firm has participated in 
the scheme, D. The reason is that observed and unobserved variables that affect the dependent 
variable, Y, may also affect the outcome of D; i.e., we may have a case of self-selection into 
the program. In the example with SkatteFUNN, firms that already are engaged in R&D 
activities have a larger probability of applying for an R&D subsidy than other firms do; i.e., 
there is “selection based on observables”. There may also be “selection based on 
unobservables”. For example, the decision to apply for SkatteFUNN may be based on the 
(unobserved) probability of success for already ongoing projects. Ignoring selection problems 
may lead to seriously biased estimates of causal effects. Indeed, our study shows that the way 
we control for self-selection has a major impact on the results. 
A popular approach to the self-selection problem is propensity score matching. The basic 
assumption behind this approach is that there exists a vector of exogenous covariates, X , 
such that Y and D are independent given X  (i.e., conditional independence). According to a 
result in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), a treated firm (meaning that 1D = ) and a nontreated 
firm ( 0D = ) can be matched if they have identical probability of participating in the 
program, given X. That is, they can be considered as if they were equal in all other respects 
(except for an additive error term). The difference in Y can then be calculated for all matched 
pairs and the average value of these differences is a valid estimator of the average treatment 
effect among the treated. This idea was applied by Almus and Czarnitzki (2003). However, 
we will argue that the “selection on observables” assumption behind this approach is not 
appropriate for the Norwegian SkatteFUNN scheme. 
In the presence of “selection based on unobservables” other methods must be pursued. Busom 
(2000) applies a two-stage or control function approach based on Heckman (1976, 1979). In 
this approach, an equation for whether firms participate in a public funding program is 
estimated in the first stage, from which suitable variables (“control functions”) are computed, 
and included as additional regressors in the second stage when estimating the effects of the 
program. Selection based on unobservables is also essential in the model of Crepon et al. 
(1998), often referred to as the CDM model. The CDM model assumes that there exists an 
unobserved variable for each firm that expresses some profitability criterion that governs the 
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firm’s decision to undertake R&D or not. If the unobserved variable exceeds some threshold, 
the firm will undertake a certain amount of R&D and we can observe its R&D intensity. 
Because R&D is an endogenous explanatory variable, it is replaced by its predicted value 
obtained from the first step of the (recursive) CDM model. In the second stage, various 
innovation variables (patenting, share of innovative sales out of total sales, etc.) are modeled 
conditional on the R&D activity of the firm. In addition, variables such as capital intensity, 
firm size, industry dummies, and demand pull and technology push factors are used as 
covariates. 
Although Crepon et al. (1998) are not concerned with policy evaluation per se, they address 
selectivity issues that are highly relevant also in an evaluation context. As we discuss later, it 
is likely that access to various forms of external funding is endogenous to the firm and may 
impair the estimated effects of policy interventions. Our approach can be seen as combining 
the CDM model with the control-function methodology of Busom (2000), although there are 
some notable differences. First, access to panel data enables us to condition on lagged 
innovation and patenting variables, both in the equation determining participation in 
SkatteFUNN and in the equation for innovation or patenting. Second, we also allow the 
effects of SkatteFUNN to differ between firms by incorporating random coefficients. Finally, 
because we use nonlinear binary-regression models in the second stage, the standard control 
function approach cannot be applied directly as in Busom (2000). Instead we consider a 
pseudo maximum likelihood modification of this approach. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics on R&D, innovations and patents 
3.1 Data and variables construction 
For the analysis, we use Norwegian microdata on the firms included in the 2001 and 2004 
innovation surveys, covering the three-year periods 1999–2001 and 2002–2004, respectively. 
These data are collected by Statistics Norway as a part of the annual R&D survey (we refer to 
them as R&D statistics). They contain detailed information on firms’ R&D and innovation 
activities, including total R&D expenditures (divided into intramural R&D and extramural 
R&D services), whether the firm has introduced a new product (for the firm or for the market) 
or a process innovation, and whether it has applied for a patent over the corresponding three 
year period (henceforth referred to as a subperiod). The sample for the survey is selected 
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using a stratified method for firms with 10–50 employees, whereas all firms with more than 
50 employees are included. The strata are based on industry classification (NACE codes) and 
firm size. Each survey contains about 5000 firms. By supplementing these data with 
information from the Tax Register, the Register of Employers and Employees (REE) and the 
National Education Database (NED), we obtain two repeated cross sections of the innovation 
variables and six years of observations on R&D and other variables. Table 1 presents an 
overview of the main variables and the data sources applied in our study. 
Table 1. Overview over variables and data sources 
Variable Definition Data source(s) 
inpdt 1 if firm has introduced a new product for the firm in 
the given subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
inmar 1 if firm has introduced a new product for the market 
in the given subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
inpcs 1 if firm has introduced a new production process in 
the given subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
d_patent 1 if firm has applied for a patent in the given 
subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
R R&D investment in the given year R&D statistics 
d_R 1 if R > 0 in at least one year in the given subperiod, 0 
else 
R&D statistics 
RK R&D capital stock at the end of the given year R&D statistics 
rk R&D capital intensity: RK/man-hour R&D statistics/REE 
coopf 1 if firm cooperated with another firm in R&D in the 
given subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
coopu 1 if firm cooperated with a university or research 
institute in R&D in the given subperiod, 0 else 
R&D statistics 
SFS SkatteFUNN subsidy in the given year Tax register 
d_SFS 1 if SFS > 0 in at least one year in the given subperiod, 
0 else 
Tax register 
ac Share of man-hours worked by employees with 
academic education (17 or more years of education) 
REE/NED 
Note: Subperiod includes the last three years. 
The first three variables in Table 1, inpdt, inmar and inpcs, are dummy variables indicating 
whether the firm has introduced a new product for the firm, a new product for the market or a 
new production process (during the corresponding subperiod), while the dummy variable 
d_patent indicates whether the firm has applied for a patent during the same period. All these 
variables are measures of how innovative the firm is and are considered as dependent 
variables in our analysis. 
R&D investment, R, is annual R&D investment as it is reported in the questionnaire, deflated 
by the index for labor costs of R&D in the private sector (Norwegian Research Council, 
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2003).2 The dummy variable d_R indicates whether the firm has invested in R&D in at least 
one year during the last three years. 
The (real) R&D capital stock at the end of a given year t, tRK  is computed by the perpetual 
inventory method using a constant rate of depreciation (δ = 0.15). That is: 
 1(1 ) , 1,2,...t t tRK RK R tδ −= − + = . 
Following Hall and Mairesse (1995), the benchmark for R&D capital stock at the beginning 
of the observation period for a given firm, RK0, is calculated as if it was the result of an 
infinite R&D investment series, * tR − , 0,1,2...t = , with a fixed presample growth rate (g = 
0.05). That is: 
 * * *0 1 1/( ) with /(1 ), 0,1,2,...t tRK R g R R g tδ − − += + = + = , 
(cf. equation (5) in Hall and Mairesse, 1995). We can interpret tR*  as the equilibrium growth 
path for the firm’s R&D investments. Hall and Mairesse (1995) use the estimator *1 1R R= , 
which is, however, very vulnerable to measurement errors if the actual investment series tR  
for 1≤t  deviates from the constant growth rate assumption near 1=t  (more distant historic 
values carry less weight due to discounting). We instead apply a more robust estimator by 
averaging investment observations in the neighborhood of 1=t : *1 1/ ttR T R= ∑ ; i.e., the 
average R&D investment for the firm using all available data sources.3 Here T is the number 
of observations on the given firm, whereas the summation is over all t where data are 
available. This estimator is obviously less influenced by random fluctuations in the observed 
investment series. R&D capital intensity, rk, is calculated as the R&D capital stock per man-
hour, where the latter is the sum of all man-hours in the firm. 
The two variables, coopf and coopu, indicate whether the firm cooperated with another firm 
(coopf) or with a university or research institute (coopu) when carrying out R&D during the 
                                                 
2 More than 60 percent of total R&D expenditures are made up of labor costs. 
3 We use all available data on the firm’s R&D investments from the biannual 1993–1999 R&D surveys, and the annual 2001–
2005 R&D surveys. Although the sample we analyze in this paper is restricted to 1999–2004, we also utilize the out-of-
sample data to estimate the initial R&D capital stock, if available for the given firm. 
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last three years. The SkatteFUNN subsidy, SFS, is the tax deductions obtained by the firm as 
a result of participation in SkatteFUNN. It is deflated by the same index as R&D investments. 
The dummy variable d_SFS indicates whether the firm obtained a SkatteFUNN subsidy in at 
least one year during the corresponding subperiod. These two variables have positive values 
only for the second subperiod, i.e., 2002–2004, because SkatteFUNN was introduced in 2002. 
For each firm, we distinguish between two types of employees: those with academic 
education (corresponding to a Master or PhD level of education) and those without. We 
assume that the former group is highly relevant to R&D activity in the firm. The variable ac is 
defined as the number of man-hours worked by employees with academic education divided 
by the total number of man-hours in the firm. 
There are 3896 and 4655 firms in the 2001 and 2004 innovation surveys respectively. After 
merging them and excluding firms with incomplete information on the variables of interest, 
we obtain a reduced unbalanced panel of 2476 firms. Keeping only firms included in both 
surveys gives us a balanced panel of 1689 firms. One should note that as a result of our 
choices, the final sample contains a high percentage of medium to large firms and firms in 
manufacturing and services, compared with the whole population. 
Table 2. Mean values of key variables 
 1999–2001 2002–2004 
Number of firms 1689 1689 
rk 0.12 (0.35) 0.12 (0.38) 
ac 5.9% 6.4% 
   
Share of firms with d_R = 1 39.8% 53.6% 
rk | d_R = 1 0.26 (0.51) 0.22 (0.50) 
ac| d_R = 1 9.3% 9.0% 
   
Share of firms with all SFS > 0 – 10.5% 
Share of firms with d_SFS = 1 – 36.2% 
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. All means are over three year periods. all SFS > 0 indicates that the firm 
obtained SkatteFUNN subsidy each year during the corresponding three-year period. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics on R&D, innovations and patents 
For our sample of firms, Table 2 reports the mean (and standard deviation) for R&D capital 
intensity, rk, and the share of man-hours worked by employees with academic education, ac, 
in the two subperiods. We compute these measures both for the total sample of firms and for 
the subsample of firms that had some R&D activity during the relevant subperiod (d_R = 1).  
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Not surprisingly, the share of man-hours worked by employees with academic education, ac, 
is higher for the firms that invest in R&D. Moreover, more firms invested in R&D (d_R = 1) 
in the second subperiod; i.e., about 40 percent in 1999–2001 versus about 54 percent in 2002–
2004. However, with respect to R&D capital intensity, the R&D projects in the second 
subperiod seem to be smaller than in the first one. Turning to the SkatteFUNN variables, we 
see that 10.5 percent of the firms in the sample received a tax subsidy each year in 2002–2004 
(all SFS > 0). The share of firms who received a subsidy at least once during 2002–2004 
(d_SFS = 1) is much higher; i.e., 36.2 percent. 
Table 3. The share of innovative firms by the type of innovation and patenting, percent 
 1999–2001 2002–2004 
New product for the firm (inpdt) 41.2 36.7 
New product for market (inmar) 18.6 19.5 
New production process (inpcs) 33.3 22.4 
Applied for a patent (d_patent) 13.9 13.9 
   
inpdt | d_R = 1 81.0 61.6 
inmar | d_R = 1 39.4 33.9 
inpcs | d_R = 1 62.2 38.4 
patent | d_R = 1 28.7 23.3 
   
inpdt | d_SFS = 1 – 65.8 
inmar | d_SFS = 1 – 38.6 
inpces | d_SFS = 1 – 39.9 
d_patent | d_SFS = 1 – 24.6 
Note: 1689 firms in each subperiod. 
Table 3 gives information about the firms’ innovation and patenting activities in 1999–2001 
and 2002–2004. The first group of rows reports, separately for each subperiod, the share of 
innovative firms by different types of innovations and patent application. The next two groups 
of rows report the share of innovative firms in the two subsamples—the firms carrying out 
some R&D activity (d_R = 1) and the SkatteFUNN firms (d_SFS = 1), respectively. One can 
see that the most frequent type of innovation for Norwegian firms is a new product for the 
firm, followed by a new production process. Less than 20 percent of these firms innovate in 
the form of a new product for the market and only about 14 percent apply for a patent. Firms 
with positive R&D investments and SkatteFUNN firms are more innovative than other firms 
in both subperiods. 
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4. Methods 
In this section we describe the models we use to study the effects of SkatteFUNN on 
patenting and different types of innovations. The dependent variable, tY , is a binary variable 
that either takes the value 1 (“success”) or 0 (“failure”). With reference to the variable 
definitions in Table 1, we will study the following four types of innovations: (i) 
tY = “d_patent”, (ii) tY =  “inpdt”, (iii) tY =  “inmar”, and (iv) tY =  “inpcs”. In the case (i), 
tY = 1 means that the firm applied for at least one patent in subperiod t. In the cases (ii)–(iv), 
tY = 1 means that the corresponding type of innovation occurred in subperiod t. The time 
index t takes two values: t = 1 refers to the subperiod 1999–2001 (the three years before the 
introduction of SkatteFUNN), while t = 2 refers to the subperiod 2002–2004 (the three years 
following the introduction of SkatteFUNN in 2002). 
The main purpose of our analysis is to estimate the causal effect of SkatteFUNN on the 
probability of the various types of innovations. Conceptually, one can think of innovations as 
the output of a production function, with R&D capital as an input factor. The impact of the 
tax credit on the innovation output of the firms then depends on two things: (i) how much the 
tax credit increases R&D investments compared with the (hypothetical) situation without any 
tax credit, and (ii) whether this (marginal) investment leads to an innovation or not. Ideally, 
we should be able to observe for each firm (i) and (ii). In practice, however, we only observe 
whether a firm participates in SkatteFUNN or not (d_SKF), and whether it innovates or not 
( tY ). If firms that have R&D projects with a high a priori probability of being successful also 
have the highest probability of participating in SkatteFUNN, d_SKF will be an endogenous 
variable due to self-selection based on unobservables. Hence, to identify causal effects we 
need to identify sources of exogenous variation in d_SKF. 
Before proceeding to the formulation of empirical models, it is useful to consider the 
following question: in what way may SkatteFUNN change the behavior of a firm? One 
obvious answer is: by reducing the marginal cost of R&D. However, because the tax credit is 
limited to project costs of up to 4 million NOK per year, only the firms that would have 
invested less than 4 million NOK in R&D in the absence of SkatteFUNN have their marginal 
cost reduced. Another way SkatteFUNN may affect a firm’s behavior is when the firm is 
liquidity constrained. Then the tax credit may finance R&D investments that may have been 
profitable also in the absence of the scheme (see Hall, 2002, for a discussion of the 
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importance of financing constraints for R&D investments).4 These arguments suggest that the 
firms whose behavior is affected by SkatteFUNN either have their marginal costs of R&D 
reduced or are liquidity constrained. Clearly, firms that do not change their behavior because 
of SkatteFUNN may also participate in the scheme (and are thus included in the “treatment 
group”), e.g., firms whose R&D investments are not liquidity constrained and regularly 
exceed 4 million NOK. 
The above discussion highlights an important aspect of the SkatteFUNN scheme—the 
average effect of SkatteFUNN on the firms that participate in the scheme (“the average 
treatment effect on the treated”) is a weighted average of 0 (the contribution from participants 
whose behavior is not affected) and the average effect among participants who increase their 
R&D as a result of the tax credit. On the other hand, firms that do not participate (“the control 
group”) do so because the scheme does not give them sufficient incentive to change their 
behavior. The latter group is very heterogeneous and comprises firms where the demand for 
R&D is locally inelastic (possibly due to fixed costs or indivisibilities in R&D investments), 
and firms that do not bother to participate in SkatteFUNN even if they may be eligible for tax 
credits.5 
Our empirical analyses are based on three different versions of logistic regression. The first 
version should be considered as merely providing descriptive statistics. Here tY  is regressed 
on a vector of explanatory variables, tX : 
(1) 1Pr( 1| )
1 exp( )t t t
Y X
X β= = + − . 
That is, (1) is a standard logit model, where Pr( 1| )t tY X=  denotes the probability of 
“success” for a given firm in period t given tX , where tX  is a (row) vector of independent 
                                                 
4 Most government revenue loss is not in the form of reduced taxes, but payment of grants to firms that are not in a tax 
position. Since 2002, roughly 75 percent of the subsidies have been given as grants and this share has been a very stable 
feature of the scheme irrespective of business cycle fluctuations. In fact, firms that are not in a tax position are significantly 
overrepresented among the SkatteFUNN firms, even when we control for a broad set of covariates, including industry 
dummies, firm age, operating margins and value added per man-hour. Since a firm’s tax position is likely to be positively 
correlated with its access to funds, these data strongly suggest that firms with poor liquidity are over-represented among the 
SkatteFUNN firms. 
5 In fact, about 41 percent of firms that reported positive R&D expenditure in 2004 did not apply for SkatteFUNN tax credits. 
This suggests that many firms do not bother to apply, even if they are eligible for tax credits. 
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variables (covariates) and β  is the corresponding (column) vector of regression coefficients. 
The vector tX  contains dummies for subperiod 1 (d_t = 1) or 2 (d_t = 2); intervals for the 
number of employees: [10,20), [20,50), )100,50[ and ),100[ ∞ ; industry (construction, retail 
trade, transportation services, other services and different manufacturing groups)6; whether 
the firm obtained SkatteFUNN subsidies (d_SFS); and whether the firm cooperates with other 
firms (coopf) and/or a university or research institute (coopu) when carrying out R&D. 
Through the interaction terms d_SFS × coopf and d_SFS × coopu, we also allow the effect of 
SkatteFUNN to depend on whether the firm has such cooperation or not. Finally, tX  contains 
two continuous regressors: the share of total man-hours by employees with academic 
education (ac) and R&D capital per man-hour (rk). 
The date of the variables in tX  refers, in most cases, to the beginning of subperiod t. For 
example, rk in subperiod t = 1 refers to the R&D capital per man-hour in 1999. We choose 
this dating to reduce the potential endogeneity problem that occurs if the right-hand side 
variables can be adjusted as a consequence of changes in the dependent variable, tY . For 
example, the firm can increase its R&D investment or initiate a joint research project with 
another firm as a consequence of an innovation. The one exception to this dating convention 
regards the dummy variable d_SFS, which is one if the firm gets SkatteFUNN subsidies 
during the three year period t, leading to a potential problem of simultaneous causality. 
One obvious shortcoming of specification (1) is that it does not take into account the 
persistence of innovation activities at the firm level; i.e., that the dependent variable, 2Y , may 
depend on 1Y  (given the explanatory variables 2X ).
7 For example, we expect, ceteris paribus, 
that the probability of innovating in the second subperiod ( 2 1Y = ) is larger for firms that 
innovated in the first subperiod ( 1 1Y = ) than for those that did not ( 1 0Y = ). 
Valid statistical inferences in the framework of equation (1) require that d_SFS is independent 
of tY  given the covariates, tX (i.e., conditional independence). This assumption will not be 
fulfilled if the firms that independently of SkatteFUNN would have had the highest number of 
                                                 
6 All industry definitions and the definition of 11 manufacturing groups are based on NACE-codes, SN2002. 
7 Earlier studies have shown that innovation is a quite persistent feature of firms cf. Peters (2007). 
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patents or innovations also have the highest probability of participating in SkatteFUNN (given 
the observable exogenous variables). 
In our second econometric specification, we attempt to address the self-selection problem by 
assuming that: 
(2) { }2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
1Pr( 1| , )
1 exp -( ( _ ) )
Y X Y
X Y d SFS Yβ α α= = + + + × , 
where we model the probability of success in subperiod 2 (the probability that 12 =Y ) 
conditional on the dependent variable in subperiod 1, 1Y , and the explanatory variables in 
subperiod 2, 2X . In addition, we include an interaction effect between the lagged dependent 
variable and SkatteFUNN, 1_d SFS Y× . The interaction term allows the effect of SkatteFUNN 
to depend on whether the firm had patents/innovations in the previous subperiod (i.e., it 
depends on 1Y ). The validity of specification (2) rests on the assumption that the firms that 
obtained SkatteFUNN in period 2 constitute a randomized sample from the population of all 
firms given the value of the independent variables 2X  and the lagged value of the dependent 
variable, 1Y . Thus, the SkatteFUNN firms are allowed to be a self-selected subsample based 
on the previous outcome of the dependent variable. 
Even if the conditional independence assumption behind (2) is weaker than for (1), it may still 
not be valid. This may be the case if the decision to apply for SkatteFUNN (or to accept the 
application) is based on the (unobserved) probability of success for already ongoing projects. 
Thus, there may be simultaneous causality that cannot be accounted for simply by 
conditioning on the lagged dependent variable. 
To account for simultaneous causality we propose a third and more elaborate econometric 
specification, which is a generalization of (2) in two ways. First, the binary variable d_SFS is 
allowed to be endogenous in the sense that an unobserved variable that influences 2Y  is also 
allowed to influence the outcome of d_SFS. Second, we allow unobserved heterogeneity in 
the effects of SkatteFUNN by letting the coefficients of d_SFS—inclusive of the interaction 
terms—to be random coefficients (and hence vary across firms). The latter extension is 
warranted by the discussion at the beginning of this section, where we argued that the 
16 
treatment effect of SkatteFUNN is not homogeneous across all potential participants in the 
scheme. 
To present this model more formally, let *X  be a continuous latent index, such that 
_ 1d SFS =  if the value of *X  is larger than 0: 
(3) 
*1 if >0 
_
0 else
X
d SFS ⎧= ⎨⎩ . 
Furthermore, we assume that: 
(4) * (1) (1)1X Z γ ε= + , 
where (1)Z  is a row-vector of exogenous or predetermined variables that determine the 
probability that _ 1d SFS = , 1γ  is a fixed vector of (unknown) parameters, and (1)ε  is 
normally distributed with expectation 0 and variance 1. The equations (3) and (4) thus 
represent a standard probit model for the binary dependent variable d_SFS. In our 
specification of (1)Z  we include all variables in tX  except the (endogenous) variables that 
involve d_SFS. In addition, we include dummies for the region, the lagged innovation 
variable, 1Y , and a binary variable taxposition, which is 1 if the firm is in a tax position (i.e., 
pays taxes) in the beginning of subperiod 2; i.e., in 2002. The variables in (1)Z  are thus as 
follows: 
(1)Z  = (1, dummies for employment intervals, industries and regions, ac, rk, coopf, coopu, 
taxposition, 1Y ). 
The outcome of the innovation variable 2Y , is also assumed to be determined by a probit 
model: 
(5) 
*
2
1 if >0 
0 else,
Y
Y ⎧= ⎨⎩  
where: 
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(6) * (2) (2)2 ( )Y Z Sγ β η ε= + + + . 
In equation (6), (2)Z  includes the same variables as (1)Z , except taxposition and the regional 
dummies. That is: 
(2)Z = (1, dummies for employment intervals and industries, ac, rk, coopf, coopu, Y1). 
Furthermore, the vector S contains the endogenous variables that involve d_SFS: 
 S = (d_SFS, d_SFS × coopf, d_SFS × coopu, d_SFS × Y1). 
Moreover, 2γ  and β  are fixed regression coefficients, η  is a random coefficient vector with 
expected value 0, (2)ε  is an additive error term with expectation 0 and variance 1. The vector 
(1) (2)( , , ')ε ε η  is assumed to have a multinormal distribution with expectation 0 and an 
unrestricted covariance matrix; except for the identifying restrictions that (1)ε  and (2)ε both 
have variance 1. 
Models (3)–(6) generalize Model (2) in two important ways. First, the additive error term, 
(1)ε , in the equation that determines participation in SkatteFUNN, is allowed to be correlated 
with the additive error term, (2)ε , in the equation that determines the latent innovation 
variable *Y . Secondly, we allow for heterogeneity in the effects of the endogenous 
explanatory variables through the vector of random slope coefficients η . 
The variable taxposition and the regional dummies could be interpreted as “instruments”; i.e., 
variables that are supposed to affect the participation in SkatteFUNN but not the probability 
of innovations per se (they are excluded from (2)Z ). The validity of these exclusion 
restrictions will be discussed further in Section 5. 
If *Y  were a directly observable variable, Models (3)–(6) would be a special case of the 
general ordered probit model analyzed by Dagsvik et al. (2006), and estimation could be 
carried out by the maximum likelihood methods derived there. However, because *Y  is not 
observable—we only observe the binary variable 2Y —the methods in Dagsvik et al. (2006) 
must be modified. Our approach consists of two steps. In step one, we estimate the probit-
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model (3)–(4) in the traditional way. In step two, given the estimates of 1γ  from the first step, 
we reformulate (6) in a way similar to that in Dagsvik et al. (2006): 
(7) * (2) *2 ( _ ) ( _ )Y Z S S d SFS d SFSγ β λ ρ λ ξ ε= + − − + , 
where the error term *ε  has conditional expectation equal to 0 given (2)Z  and S. In (7), ρ  is 
an unknown parameter vector, ξ  is an unknown parameter, and ( _ )d SFSλ  is an inverse 
Mills ratio (depending on the estimates of parameters 1γ  obtained in the first step). See, e.g., 
Heckman (1976): 
(8) 
(1)
1
(1)
1
(1)
1
(1)
1
( ) if _ 0 
( )
( _ )
( ) if _ 1.
1 ( )
t
t
t
t
Z d SFS
Z
d SFS
Z d SFS
Z
φ γ
γλ φ γ
γ
−⎧ =⎪ Φ −⎪= ⎨ − −⎪ =⎪ − Φ −⎩
 
In (8), ( )φ ⋅  and ( )Φ ⋅ are the standard normal probability density and cumulative distribution 
function, respectively. By postulating a logistic distribution for *ε , we obtain a logit model 
for 2Y . The corresponding logit estimates of 2γ  and β can be interpreted as pseudo maximum 
likelihood estimates, cf. Gourieroux at al. (1984). 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Which firms participate in SkatteFUNN? 
We consider first the estimation of the SkatteFUNN-participation equation (4). We will 
further use the results of this estimation to calculate the function ( )λ ⋅ , defined in (8), to 
estimate the innovation equation (7). The problems we address in this subsection have many 
similarities with Blanes and Busom (2004), who study participation in R&D subsidy 
programs for Spanish manufacturing firms. Like Blanes and Busom (2004), we include 
measures of the skill of the employees, lagged R&D activity, firm size and financing 
constraints as explanatory variables in the participation equation. 
A key role in our estimation is assigned to the variable taxposition and the regional indicators, 
which are contained in (1)Z , but not in (2)Z . The exclusion restrictions contribute to 
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identifying the effects of participating in SkatteFUNN: For a given value of (2)Z , variation in 
the excluded variables contributes to exogenous variation in S . The identification, of course, 
requires that regional location or whether a firm is in a tax position or not, has no direct effect 
on innovation probability. 
The results in Table 4 show that three of the regional dummies (south, west, and mid-
Norway) are significant and have a positive sign (the coefficient of the capital region Oslo is 0 
a priori). Norway has a long tradition of taking regional considerations into account when 
deciding on policies, with a bias in favor of remote and sparsely populated regions. This may 
also be relevant for SkatteFUNN, even if the scheme is open to all firms. The reason is that 
firms apply for SkatteFUNN funding through regional offices of Innovation Norway, a 
government body that helps firms in their innovation activities. These regional offices may 
differ in their ability to support firms in getting their applications approved by the Norwegian 
Research Council (cf. Appendix A). On the other hand, there is little reason to believe that 
heterogeneity in the resources of the regional offices of Innovation Norway has a direct effect 
on the probability of success of the research projects. Nor do we find that the regional 
dummies are significant in any of the innovation equations (when carrying out joint likelihood 
ratio tests). Thus, the region of the firm seems to have no direct effect on the probability of 
innovating. 
From Table 4 we also observe a significant negative relation between SkatteFUNN and the 
variable taxposition. A plausible explanation, as suggested in our discussion at the beginning 
of Section 4, is that participation in SkatteFUNN could be motivated by the liquidity situation 
of the firm. Another explanation could be that taxposition is negatively correlated with the 
firm’s tax planning abilities, including knowledge about and active use of tax reducing 
schemes such as SkatteFUNN.8 In any case, this variable should not be informative about the 
probability of innovating per se, given the exogenous and predetermined explanatory 
variables of the model. 
The main rationale for the “exclusion restriction” with regard to taxposition is that, while 
financing constraints may restrict a firm’s R&D investments, it is not a production factor per 
se. That is, given the vector of productive inputs at the beginning of the three-year period 
                                                 
8 This interpretation was suggested to us by an accountant who had experience in auditing firms subsidized by the 
SkatteFUNN scheme. 
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(including R&D capital stock), information about whether or not the firm is liquidity 
constrained (at that point in time) does not help us to predict its innovation probability during 
the corresponding subperiod. Given that the regional dummies provide valid identifying 
restrictions (cf. the discussion above), it is also possible to test this assumption by including 
taxposition as an explanatory variable in the innovation equations. In neither of the equations 
do we reject the hypothesis that the coefficient of taxposition is zero. 
Table 4. Probit estimates for the probability of d_SFS = 1 
Variable Estimate S.E. 
Dummy for:   
10–19 employees –0.36 0.23 
20–49 employees –0.08 0.22 
50–99 employees –0.10 0.22 
≥ 100 employees –0.27 0.21 
Construction 0.38 0.26 
Retail trade 0.07 0.24 
Transport –0.30 0.19 
Services 0.55 0.18 
Industry A (Nace 15–16) 0.65 0.18 
Industry BC (Nace 17–19) 0.64 0.23 
Industry D (Nace 20) 0.62 0.23 
Industry E (Nace 21–22) 0.16 0.19 
Industry FGH (Nace 23–25) 0.91 0.21 
Industry I (Nace 26) 0.48 0.24 
Industry J (Nace 27–28) 0.69 0.19 
Industry K (Nace 29) 1.09 0.21 
Industry L (Nace 30–33) 0.80 0.20 
Industry M (Nace 34–35) 0.73 0.19 
Industry N (Nace 36–37) 1.20 0.23 
East coast  0.10 0.12 
East inland 0.11 0.17 
South  0.64 0.12 
West  0.41 0.12 
Mid-Norway 0.39 0.15 
North  0.29 0.18 
ac 1.18 0.35 
rk 0.13 0.07 
coopf 0.30 0.10 
coopu 0.39 0.12 
taxposition –0.16 0.07 
Yt–1 (lagged dummy for innovations) 0.44 0.08 
Constant 1.19 0.26 
Note: There are seven main regions in Norway, where the capital region Oslo is made the reference. 
The results in Table 4 also show that past innovation activities, Yt–1, have a huge impact on 
participation in SkatteFUNN—the dummy for lagged innovations is clearly the most 
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significant variable in the table. The share of man-hours worked by persons with academic 
education, ac, and both types of cooperation, coopf and coopu, also have large impacts on the 
participation probability. There is considerable heterogeneity across different industries, with 
firms from some of the manufacturing industries having, ceteris paribus, the highest 
probability of participating in SkatteFUNN. 
5.2 Estimation results for innovations and patents 
Tables 5–8 present the results for the four different dependent variables and three different 
versions of the econometric model. The tables focus on the most important explanatory 
variables. We do not report results for control variables such as firm size and industry. Our 
estimates regarding these variables are in line with results well established elsewhere in the 
empirical literature: firms with more employees have a higher probability of patenting or 
innovating than other firms, while manufacturing industries are those with the highest 
probability of patent applications and innovations. 
Table 5. Logistic regression. Dependent variable: Yt = “d_patent” (patents) 
logit conditional logit  conditional logit  with selection Variable* 
Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.** 
Dummy for:       
1999–2001 –3.45 0.40 – – – – 
2002–2004 –3.55 0.40 –3.55 0.51 –4.12 0.77 
ac 2.39 0.47 0.75 0.88 0.51 0.94 
rk 0.85 0.11 0.39 0.16 0.29 0.22 
coopf 0.62 0.13 0.43 0.22 0.49 0.24 
coopu 0.80 0.14 0.61 0.26 0.80 0.27 
d_SFS 0.24 0.23 0.44 0.30 1.10 1.18 
d_SFS × coopf 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.23 0.31 
d_SFS × coopu 0.15 0.22 0.10 0.29 0.05 0.29 
d_SFS × Yt–1 – – 0.07 0.35 0.16 0.40 
Yt–1 – – 2.54 0.26 2.54 0.31 
Number of firms in the sample 2467 1527 1527 
* Size and industry dummies are included in the analyses but not reported here. 
** S.E. calculated conditional on the step-1 estimates. 
Table 5 shows the results for patents. We first note that the estimate of the coefficient of the 
time dummy of the second period is lower than for the first one in the (standard) logit model. 
This corresponds to a drop of approximately 10 percent in total patent applications in Norway 
between these two subperiods. In the standard logit model, the share of employees with 
academic education, ac, and R&D capital intensity, rk, are also very significant explanatory 
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variables. This result is typical in the literature; cf. Crepon et al. (1998), Parisi et al. (2006), 
and Griffith et al. (2006). 
The coefficient of d_SFS is not significant in any of the three model specifications reported in 
Table 5. However, a joint hypothesis of whether all the parameters involving SkatteFUNN-
variables are zero is rejected in the standard logit model, with a p-value of 0.01. The 
conditional logit model that allows d_SFS to be endogenous (cf. the two last columns) gives 
estimates for the effect of SkatteFUNN that are less significant than in the simple conditional 
logit model. For example, a joint test that d_SFS has zero effect on patenting yields a p-value 
of 0.63. Thus there is no evidence that the SkatteFUNN scheme affects the probability of 
patent applications. We can also see that by conditioning on Yt–1, much of the explanatory 
power of rk and ac disappears compared with the standard logit model. On the other hand, the 
dummies for cooperation coopf and coopu are very significant in all the three model variants, 
especially cooperation with a research institute (coopu). 
Table 6. Logistic regression. Dependent variable: Yt = “inpdt” (new product for the 
firm)  
logit conditional logit  conditional logit with selection Variable* 
Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.** 
Dummy for:       
1999–2001 –1.44 0.28 – – – – 
2002–2004 –2.07 0.28 –2.93 0.47 –2.72 0.53 
ac 1.12 0.45 1.60 0.71 2.30 0.82 
rk 0.74 0.19 –0.01 0.14 –0.02 0.17 
coopf 1.19 0.12 0.47 0.21 0.53 0.22 
coopu 0.67 0.14 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.28 
d_SFS 1.52 0.17 1.68 0.22 1.48 0.86 
d_SFS × coopf 0.19 0.21 0.48 0.25 0.44 0.27 
d_SFS × coopu –0.03 0.23 0.17 0.27 0.07 0.29 
d_SFS × Yt–1 – – –0.92 0.28 –1.20 0.31 
Yt–1 – – 1.91 0.17 2.32 0.25 
Number of firms in the sample 2467 1484 1484 
* Size and industry dummies are included in the analyses but not reported here. 
** S.E. calculated conditional on the step-1 estimates. 
Let us now turn to the results for innovations reported in Tables 6–8. One can observe a 
general pattern for all three types of innovations. From the standard logit model we find that 
the share of academics (ac) and R&D capital per man-hour (rk) are very significant variables. 
In the two conditional logit models, however, we find no significant impact of rk on the 
probability of innovating. The explanation may be that the value of the lagged dependent 
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variable 1tY −  also incorporates the effect of rk, because these variables are highly correlated as 
evident from the standard logit model. Again, we find that the coefficient of 1tY −  is highly 
significant and positive and of a similar magnitude in the two conditional models. For all 
innovation types, we find that cooperation with another firm (coopf) is a significant 
explanatory variable in contrast to the case of patenting, where coopu (cooperation with a 
research institute) is more influential. This difference may reflect that innovations in general 
are “closer to the market” than patenting, where academically oriented collaboration is more 
important. 
Table 7. Logistic regression. Dependent variable: Yt = “inmar” (new product for the 
market) 
logit conditional logit  conditional logit with selection Variable* 
Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.** 
Dummy for:       
1999–2001 –3.21 0.31 – – – – 
2002–2004 –3.05 0.32 –3.67 0.47 –3.52 0.55 
ac 1.49 0.38 1.34 0.62 1.73 0.73 
rk 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.15 
coopf 0.87 0.11 0.57 0.19 0.61 0.50 
coopu 0.60 0.13 0.43 0.23 0.72 0.46 
d_SFS 1.25 0.16 1.51 0.20 1.10 0.84 
d_SFS × coopf 0.10 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.24 
d_SFS × coopu 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.16 0.25 
d_SFS × Yt–1 – – –1.16 0.29 –1.30 0.34 
Yt–1 – – 2.09 0.21 2.39 0.27 
Number of firms in the sample 2467 1484 1484 
* Size and industry dummies are included in the analyses but not reported here. 
** S.E. calculated conditional on the step-1 estimates. 
The SkatteFUNN dummy is clearly significant in the standard logit and conditional logit 
models, but not in the model where d_SFS is allowed to be endogenous. The interaction effect 
between d_SFS and cooperation with another firm (d_SFS × coopf) is significant at the 95 
percent level in the conditional logit model, and 90 percent level in the conditional model 
with selection. The estimated interaction effect d_SFS × Yt–1 is negative and significant in both 
the conditional models: if the firm was innovating before getting a SkatteFUNN subsidy, the 
effect of SkatteFUNN is weaker. Likelihood ratio tests of the joint hypothesis that all the 
variables involving d_SFS have corresponding coefficients equal to zero (4 degrees of 
freedom in the standard logit model, and 5 degrees of freedom in the conditional logit models) 
were clearly rejected in all the model variants, with p-values close to zero. 
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Table 8. Logistic regression. Dependent variable: Yt = “inpcs” (new production process) 
logit conditional logit  conditional logit with selection Variable* 
Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.** 
Dummy for:       
1999–2001 –1.71 0.27 – – – – 
2002–2004 –2.44 0.28 –2.57 0.45 –3.71 0.54 
ac 0.60 0.39 0.65 0.58 1.42 1.13 
rk 0.13 0.09 –0.10 0.13 0.13 0.15 
coopf 0.85 0.11 0.47 0.18 0.61 0.20 
coopu 0.63 0.13 0.43 0.21 0.47 0.26 
d_SFS 1.27 0.16 1.44 0.19 1.88 0.87 
d_SFS × coopf –0.01 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.24 
d_SFS × coopu –0.14 0.19 –0.10 0.22 0.15 0.25 
d_SFS × Yt–1 – – –0.98 0.24 –1.30 0.34 
Yt–1 – – 1.81 0.17 2.31 0.25 
Number of firms in the sample 2467 1484 1484 
* Size and industry dummies are included in the analyses but not reported here. 
** S.E. calculated conditional on the step-1 estimates. 
From the very significant coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable, Yt–1, for all 
four types of innovation (see Tables 5–8) we can infer that innovation is a rather persistent 
characteristic of a firm. This is illustrated by the estimated conditional probabilities of 
innovation in Table 9 (based on the results reported in Tables 5–8). For example, the 
conditional probability of patenting in subperiod t, given that the firm applied for a patent in 
subperiod t–1, is 0.54 (S.E. = 0.05) if d_SFS = 0 and 0.74 (S.E. = 0.03) if d_SFS = 1. The 
corresponding numbers when 1 0tY − = , i.e., the firm did not apply for patents in subperiod t–1, 
are much smaller: 0.04 (S.E. = 0.01) and 0.10 (S.E. = 0.01), respectively. For other types of 
innovation we observe the same pattern. However, the pairwise differences obtained by 
comparing d_SFS = 0 with d_SFS = 1 cannot be interpreted as effects of SkatteFUNN, 
because they reflect a gross effect—firms with d_SFS = 1 have, on average, different values 
for the other explanatory variables in tX , which have been “marginalized out” to obtain the 
estimated conditional probabilities reported in Table 9.9 
Let us now look at the estimates for the partial effects of SkatteFUNN on the different types 
of product and process innovations. We will restrict this part of the analysis to the model with 
                                                 
9 If Z denotes the vector of variables that are “marginalized out”, then, for example: 
1 1 1Pr( 1 | 1, _ 0) Pr( 1 | 1, _ 0, ) Pr( | 1, _ 0)t t t t t
z
Y Y d SFS Y Y d SFS Z z Z z Y d SFS− − −= = = = = = = = = = =∑ . 
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selection specified in (5)–(8), where d_SFS specified as an endogenous variable, and to two 
types of innovations: a new product for the firm and a new production process. For these 
types of innovations, we clearly reject the joint hypothesis that all the variables involving 
d_SFS have zero coefficients. 
Table 9. Estimated probabilities of innovation conditional on previous innovation 
activity and participation in SkatteFUNN* 
 Type of innovation 
Probability Patent New product for the firm 
New product 
for the market 
New 
production 
process 
Pr(Yt = 1| Yt–1 = 1, d_SFS = 0) 0.54 0.65 0.61 0.56 
Pr(Yt = 1| Yt–1 = 1, d_SFS = 1) 0.74 0.90 0.79 0.74 
Pr(Yt = 1| Yt–1 = 0, d_SFS = 0) 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.14 
Pr(Yt = 1| Yt–1 = 0, d_SFS = 1) 0.10 0.66 0.48 0.49 
* Based on conditional logit with selection. 
Estimates of the partial effects of SkatteFUNN subsidies on the probability of a new product 
for the firm are presented in part (1) of Table 10. We see that a significant positive effect is 
found only for firms that did not innovate in the previous subperiod and cooperated with 
another firm. For example, for a representative firm with such cooperation and no innovation 
in the previous subperiod (and average values of all other variables), the effect of a change in 
the value of d_SFS from 0 to 1is given by a logit coefficient of 1.92 (S.E. = 0.90).10 This 
change increases the probability of a new product for the firm by 0.26 from 0.16 (see Table 6 
and Table 10). In the case of cooperation with both, i.e., another firm and a research institute, 
this probability increases by 0.27. On the other hand, if the firm, ceteris paribus, had such an 
innovation in the previous subperiod, the effect of SkatteFUNN becomes insignificant. 
The partial effects of SkatteFUNN subsidies on the probability of a new production process 
are presented in part (2) of Table 10. We see that these effects are highly dependent on the 
lagged dependent variable, 1tY − . For a firm with no cooperation and no process innovations in 
the previous subperiod, the estimated effect is given by a logit coefficient of 1.88 (S.E. = 
0.87), which is significant at the 5 percent level. For a representative firm, this means an 
increase in the probability of a process innovation equal to 0.23 (from 0.14) as a result of the 
SkatteFUNN subsidy (see Table 8 and Table 10). If the firm also cooperated with another 
                                                 
10 Formally, this is the change in the log odds ln( /(1 ))p p− , where p is the probability of innovation. 
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firm or a research institute the probability of a process innovation increases by 0.24 (and by 
0.26 in the case of cooperation with both another firm and a research institute). On the other 
hand, if the firm, ceteris paribus, had innovations in the previous subperiod, none of the 
partial effects are significant. 
Table 10. Partial effects of SkatteFUNN on the probability of innovating (new product 
for the firm and process innovation) 
 (1) New product for the firm (2) New production process 
Conditional on Share of obs. 
Estimated 
logit S.E. 
Changes in 
probability 
Share 
of obs. 
Estimated 
logit S.E. 
Changes in 
probability 
Yt–1 =0,coopf =0,coopu =0 0.48 1.48 0.86 0.20 0.52 1.88 0.87 0.23 
Yt–1 =0,coopf =1,coopu =0 0.02 1.92 0.90 0.26 0.03 2.01 0.90 0.24 
Yt–1 =0,coopf =0,coopu =1 0.22 1.55 0.91 0.21 0.18 2.03 0.91 0.24 
Yt–1 =0,coopf =1,coopu =1 0.04 1.99 0.95 0.27 0.04 2.16 0.94 0.26 
Yt–1 =1,coopf =0,coopu =0 0.03 0.28 0.91 0.06 0.06 0.58 0.93 0.14 
Yt–1 =1,coopf =1,coopu =0 0.01 0.72 0.95 0.16 0.02 0.71 0.96 0.17 
Yt–1 =1,coopf =0,coopu =1 0.11 0.35 0.96 0.08 0.08 0.73 0.97 0.18 
Yt–1 =1,coopf =1,coopu =1 0.07 0.79 1.00 0.17 0.06 0.86 1.00 0.21 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have studied how the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme, SkatteFUNN, has 
affected firms’ innovation activities. Our results imply that the SkatteFUNN scheme 
contributes to an increase in the rate of innovation by firms. SkatteFUNN projects contribute 
to the development of new production processes and to some extent to new products for the 
firm. Firms that collaborate with other firms are more likely to have successful innovations. 
However, the scheme does not appear to contribute significantly to innovations in the form of 
new products for the market or patenting. 
Our finding that the SkatteFUNN scheme mainly stimulates innovations in the form of new 
products for the firm (but not for the market) and new production processes suggests that the 
scheme does not stimulate innovations that may create significant spillovers among the firms. 
If we take into account that the majority of firms that are subsidized through the scheme are 
SMEs, our results may not come as a surprise. Also the scheme has a cap on total subsidies 
and this feature of the scheme probably limits the possibility of achieving major innovations 
in new products for the market or patents. For stimulation of these types of innovation, other 
research policy instruments such as grants from the Norwegian Research Council are 
probably more relevant. 
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Appendix A. SkatteFUNN – background and design 
SkatteFUNN is aimed at increasing business expenditure on R&D in Norway and is part of 
the Norwegian tax system. In the parliamentary discussion on the government white paper for 
the revised national budget in 2001, a majority in the Storting (parliament) asked the 
government to design and propose to the Storting a tax incentive to stimulate business R&D 
activities. It was asked that the system be in line with a proposal suggested by the majority of 
an expert committee, which was put forward in 2000. The scheme was proposed as part of the 
tax law for 2002 and approved by the Storting in December 2001. The system was accepted 
by the ESA in October 2002 and was thus in place for SMEs for the tax year 2002. It was 
extended to cover all firms for the tax year 2003. 
SkatteFUNN is a system with tax credits, implying that firms can deduct from tax payable a 
certain amount of their R&D expenditures. Firms are entitled to the tax credit as long as the 
R&D project has been approved by the Norwegian Research Council. If the tax credit exceeds 
the tax payable by the firm the difference is paid to the firm like a grant. If the firm is not in a 
tax position at all, the whole amount of the credit is paid to the firm as a negative tax or a 
grant. This payment is done when the tax authorities have completed their tax assessment, and 
takes place the year after the actual R&D expenses have occurred. 
From 2003, the SkatteFUNN scheme is as follows. For large firms (more than 250 employees, 
more than 40 million euros in turnover or a balance sheet of more than 27 million euros, and 
owned by more than 25 percent of a large enterprise), 18 percent of R&D expenses related to 
an approved project up to a limit of 4 million NOK (approximately 0.5 million euros) is given 
as a tax credit. Thus, for a large firm the maximum tax relief is 4×0.18 = 0.72 million NOK 
(90 000 euros). If the firm has a project that involves collaboration with an approved research 
institute (according to a list decided upon by the Norwegian Research Council), it can also 
deduct expenses of a purchase of 4 million NOK in services from this institute so that the 
amount deductible becomes 1.44 million NOK (180 000 euros). For SMEs, the rate is 20 
percent. 
Since 2003, the number of projects has varied between 4000 and 6000. Since 2003, the 
revenue cost for the government has been roughly 1.3 billion NOK annually, of which nearly 
three quarters has been paid as grants. Around two thirds of the R&D expenses are personnel 
costs. Roughly 85 percent of all projects approved by the Norwegian Research Council are 
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undertaken by firms with less than 50 employees. In 2004, 13 percent of all manufacturing 
firms used SkatteFUNN compared to only 1 percent of firms in construction and services. 
Very few projects are designed as cooperation projects between firms or between firms and a 
research institute. 
When the Storting decided to introduce SkatteFUNN it also included an evaluation of the 
scheme. More information and the main results of the evaluation can be found in the summary 
of the final report: http://www.ssb.no/skattefunn/rapp_200802_en.pdf. 
